Threat Model — STRIDE Analysis
🏛️ Architecture Overview
Section titled “🏛️ Architecture Overview”flowchart LR subgraph ALTER[⚗️ THE ALTER] direction TB CHAMBER[🗄️ Chamber\nOverlayFS + Namespaces] ARTIFACTS[📦 Artifacts\nPCAP · Telemetry · Memory] end
subgraph WARD[🛡️ THE WARD] direction TB EXTRACT[🔍 extract-iocs] TAGGER[🏷️ attack-tagger] ANALYZE[📊 analyze-pcap] end
subgraph SEAL[🔏 THE SEAL] direction TB ATTEST[✍️ Attestation] SIGN[🔐 Signing] WORM[💾 WORM Storage] end
CHAMBER -->|raw evidence| ARTIFACTS ARTIFACTS -->|PCAP| ANALYZE ARTIFACTS -->|telemetry| EXTRACT ARTIFACTS -->|memory| TAGGER EXTRACT -->|IOCs| ATTEST TAGGER -->|tags| ATTEST ANALYZE -->|flows| ATTEST ATTEST -->|evidence bundle| SIGN SIGN -->|signed bundle| WORM
classDef alter fill:#1a0a2e,stroke:#8b5cf6,stroke-width:2px,color:#e9d5ff classDef ward fill:#0f172a,stroke:#22d3ee,stroke-width:2px,color:#a5f3fc classDef seal fill:#14532d,stroke:#84cc16,stroke-width:2px,color:#d9f99d class CHAMBER,ARTIFACTS alter class EXTRACT,TAGGER,ANALYZE ward class ATTEST,SIGN,WORM seal📜 STRIDE Threat Matrix
Section titled “📜 STRIDE Threat Matrix”| # | STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Current Mitigations | Recommended Mitigations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | Spoofing | Sample Substitution — Adversary swaps malware sample pre-detonation | Medium | Critical | Content-addressed storage (SHA-256), immutable sample registry | Veil of Integrity: Signed sample manifests, TPM-bound sample sealing, in-toto attestation |
| S2 | Spoofing | Worker Impersonation — Compromised analysis node claims false results | Medium | High | mTLS between Ward components, SPIFFE identity | Ward Sentinel: Short-lived workload certs, attestation-based admission, zero-trust mesh |
| S3 | Spoofing | TPM Key Extraction — Physical/local attacker extracts sealing keys | Low | Critical | TPM 2.0 with PCR binding, sealed storage | Obsidian Vault: TPM-locked keys, PCR policy binding to measured boot, anti-hammering |
| T1 | Tampering | PCAP/Telemetry Modification — Alter network captures or syscall logs post-collection | High | Critical | Append-only artifact store, Merkle tree hashing | Chronicle Chain: Hash-linked artifact log, periodic anchoring to transparency log, WORM enforcement |
| T2 | Tampering | Rule Injection — Malicious YARA/Sigma rules injected into analysis pipeline | Medium | High | Rule registry with signed packages, review workflow | Grimoire Ward: Signed rule bundles, reproducible builds, canary rule testing, diff attestation |
| T3 | Tampering | YARA Rule Corruption — Bit-flip or supply-chain compromise of detection rules | Low | Medium | Checksum verification, version pinning | Sigil Guard: Reproducible rule compilation, SBOM for rules, automated regression on rule change |
| R1 | Repudiation | Unsigned Evidence — Artifacts lack cryptographic proof of origin | High | Critical | None (gap) | Seal of Witness: Mandatory cosign/Notary v2 signing, RFC 3161 timestamps, transparency log |
| R2 | Repudiation | Missing Chain of Custody — No verifiable handoff log between Alter → Ward → Seal | High | High | Basic audit logging | Ledger of Custody: Immutable transfer receipts, CSP (Custody Sequence Protocol), witness quorum |
| R3 | Repudiation | No Attestation — Analysis results cannot be tied to specific chamber execution | Medium | High | Chamber metadata in artifacts | Attestation Root: In-toto layout, SLSA provenance, TPM quote over chamber PCRs |
| I1 | Info Disclosure | Sample Exfiltration — Malware leaks via chamber network covert channel | Medium | Critical | Network namespace isolation, egress deny | Veil of Silence: Zero-egress chamber, DNS sinkhole, TLS inspection, traffic shaping |
| I2 | Info Disclosure | Telemetry Leakage — Sensitive host/system data in syscall/memory captures | High | High | Redaction filters, PII scrubbing | Mask of Anonymity: Differential privacy on telemetry, synthetic host profiles, kernel-level redaction |
| I3 | Info Disclosure | Side-Channel Leakage — Timing/cache attacks reveal sample behavior to co-tenants | Low | Medium | Dedicated chamber nodes | Sanctum Isolation: Single-tenant chambers, cache partitioning (CAT), constant-time artifact write |
| D1 | DoS | Chamber Resource Exhaustion — Malware consumes all CPU/RAM/disk in namespace | High | High | cgroups v2 limits, pids.max, memory.max | Bound Crucible: Hard resource quotas, OOM kill priority, disk quota with reservation, watchdog |
| D2 | DoS | Pool Starvation — All chambers occupied, analysis queue backs up indefinitely | Medium | High | Queue depth monitoring, autoscaling | Reservoir Protocol: Priority inversion prevention, dead-letter queue, burst capacity reservation |
| D3 | DoS | Tetragon/eBPF DoS — Malicious probe crashes kernel tracer, blinds observability | Low | Critical | Tetragon health checks, fallback logging | Aegis Fallback: Kernel auditd fallback, userspace syscall shim, probe validation sandbox |
| E1 | EoP | Namespace Escape — Breakout from user/mount/net/pid namespace to host | Medium | Critical | User namespaces, seccomp, no-new-privs | Warded Boundary: gVisor/Kata fallback, syscall whitelist, CRI-O with Kata, runtime class |
| E2 | EoP | Sudo Wrapper Abuse — Compromised analysis tool escalates via sudoers misconfig | Low | Critical | No sudo in containers, capability drop | Keyless Ward: Rootless throughout, capability bounding set, ambient capabilities denied |
| E3 | EoP | Docker Socket Access — Chamber mounts /var/run/docker.sock, escapes to host | Low | Critical | Socket not mounted by default | Socket Seal: Podman rootless, socket activation with SELinux, socket proxy with ACL |
🔮 Threat Flow Diagrams
Section titled “🔮 Threat Flow Diagrams”Spoofing Attack Surface
Section titled “Spoofing Attack Surface”sequenceDiagram actor Adversary participant Registry as 📜 Sample Registry participant Chamber as 🗄️ Chamber participant TPM as 🔐 TPM participant Ward as 🛡️ Ward
Adversary->>Registry: Submit malicious sample (S1) Registry->>Chamber: Dispatch sample (hash verified) Chamber->>TPM: Seal sample hash to PCRs (S3) Chamber->>Ward: Emit artifacts + attestation Note over Ward: Verify attestation\nbefore processingTampering Attack Surface
Section titled “Tampering Attack Surface”flowchart TD ART[📦 Artifacts] -->|write| MERKLE[🔗 Merkle Log] MERKLE -->|anchor| TRANS[📜 Transparency Log] ART -->|verify| EXTRACT[🔍 extract-iocs] ART -->|verify| TAGGER[🏷️ attack-tagger] ART -->|verify| ANALYZE[📊 analyze-pcap]
subgraph TAMPER[Tampering Vectors] T1[PCAP modification] T2[Rule injection] T3[YARA corruption] end
T1 -.->|detected| MERKLE T2 -.->|detected| GRMOIRE[📚 Grimoire Ward] T3 -.->|detected| SIGIL[🛡️ Sigil Guard]
classDef detect fill:#7c3aed,stroke:#a855f7,color:#f5f5f5 class MERKLE,GRMOIRE,SIGIL detectRepudiation Chain of Custody
Section titled “Repudiation Chain of Custody”flowchart LR CHAMBER[🗄️ Chamber] -->|1. Artifacts + PCR Quote| ATTEST[✍️ Attestation] ATTEST -->|2. Signed Bundle| SIGN[🔐 Signing] SIGN -->|3. WORM Write| WORM[💾 WORM] WORM -->|4. Timestamp| TS[⏰ RFC3161 TSA] TS -->|5. Anchor| LOG[📜 Transparency Log]
classDef seal fill:#14532d,stroke:#84cc16,color:#d9f99d class ATTEST,SIGN,WORM,TS,LOG sealInformation Disclosure Vectors
Section titled “Information Disclosure Vectors”graph TD MALWARE[🦠 Malware] -->|covert channel| DNS[🌐 DNS] MALWARE -->|timing| CACHE[💾 Cache] MALWARE -->|syscalls| TELEM[📊 Telemetry]
DNS -->|blocked| VEIL[🕸️ Veil of Silence] CACHE -->|partitioned| SANCTUM[🏰 Sanctum Isolation] TELEM -->|redacted| MASK[🎭 Mask of Anonymity]
classDef defense fill:#0f172a,stroke:#22d3ee,color:#a5f3fc class VEIL,SANCTUM,MASK defenseDoS & Elevation of Privilege
Section titled “DoS & Elevation of Privilege”flowchart TB subgraph CHAMBER[🗄️ Chamber] CGROUP[cgroups v2] SECCOMP[seccomp-bpf] USERNS[User Namespace] PIDNS[PID Namespace] NETNS[Network Namespace] MNTNS[Mount Namespace] end
MALWARE[🦠 Malware] -->|fork bomb| PIDNS MALWARE -->|mem exhaustion| CGROUP MALWARE -->|syscall spray| SECCOMP MALWARE -->|mount escape| MNTNS MALWARE -->|net pivot| NETNS MALWARE -->|uid map| USERNS
CGROUP -->|OOM kill| WATCHDOG[👁️ Watchdog] SECCOMP -->|SIGSYS| TRAP[🪤 Syscall Trap] USERNS -->|unprivileged| ROOTLESS[🚫 Rootless]
classDef layer fill:#1a0a2e,stroke:#8b5cf6,color:#e9d5ff class CGROUP,SECCOMP,USERNS,PIDNS,NETNS,MNTNS layer📊 Risk Heat Map
Section titled “📊 Risk Heat Map”quadrantChart title Risk Matrix: Likelihood × Impact x-axis Low Likelihood --> High Likelihood y-axis Low Impact --> High Impact quadrant-1 🔴 Immediate Action quadrant-2 🟠 High Priority quadrant-3 🟡 Monitor quadrant-4 🟢 Accept
"S1: Sample Substitution": [0.6, 0.95] "S2: Worker Impersonation": [0.5, 0.75] "S3: TPM Key Extraction": [0.15, 0.95] "T1: PCAP Modification": [0.8, 0.9] "T2: Rule Injection": [0.5, 0.8] "T3: YARA Corruption": [0.2, 0.5] "R1: Unsigned Evidence": [0.9, 0.95] "R2: Missing Custody": [0.8, 0.8] "R3: No Attestation": [0.5, 0.8] "I1: Sample Exfiltration": [0.5, 0.95] "I2: Telemetry Leakage": [0.75, 0.75] "I3: Side-Channel": [0.2, 0.5] "D1: Resource Exhaustion": [0.8, 0.8] "D2: Pool Starvation": [0.5, 0.75] "D3: Tetragon DoS": [0.15, 0.95] "E1: Namespace Escape": [0.4, 0.95] "E2: Sudo Abuse": [0.1, 0.95] "E3: Docker Socket": [0.1, 0.95]🛡️ Mitigation Status Tracker
Section titled “🛡️ Mitigation Status Tracker”| Mitigation | Status | Component | Validation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Content-addressed storage | ✅ Implemented | Registry | SHA-256 verification on dispatch |
| Append-only artifact log | ✅ Implemented | Chamber | Merkle root per detonation |
| cgroups v2 hard limits | ✅ Implemented | Chamber | CPU/RAM/pids/disk quotas |
| User namespaces + seccomp | ✅ Implemented | Chamber | Rootless, no-new-privs, syscall filter |
| Network namespace zero-egress | ✅ Implemented | Chamber | DNS sinkhole, deny-all egress |
| mTLS Ward mesh | 🟡 Partial | Ward | SPIFFE certs, need rotation automation |
| Signed rule bundles | 🟡 Partial | Ward | cosign verify, need reproducible builds |
| Mandatory evidence signing | ❌ Gap | Seal | Priority 1: cosign/Notary v2 integration |
| Chain of custody ledger | ❌ Gap | Seal | Priority 1: CSP protocol design |
| In-toto attestation | ❌ Gap | Seal | Priority 2: SLSA provenance generation |
| TPM PCR binding | 🟡 Partial | Chamber | PCR 0-7 measured, need policy sealing |
| gVisor/Kata fallback | ❌ Planned | Chamber | Priority 2: RuntimeClass for high-risk |
| Transparency log anchoring | ❌ Planned | Seal | Priority 2: Rekor/Trillian integration |
| Differential privacy telemetry | ❌ Research | Ward | Priority 3: Evaluate utility tradeoff |
🕯️ Occult Glossary
Section titled “🕯️ Occult Glossary”| Term | Mundane Meaning |
|---|---|
| Alter | Detonation environment (chamber + artifact collection) |
| Ward | Analysis pipeline (extract-iocs, attack-tagger, analyze-pcap) |
| Seal | Evidence attestation, signing, and WORM storage |
| Veil | Network isolation / egress control |
| Sanctum | Single-tenant, hardware-isolated chamber |
| Grimoire | Signed, versioned rule registry (YARA, Sigma) |
| Sigil | Cryptographic integrity marker (hash, signature) |
| Chronicle | Append-only, hash-linked artifact log |
| Ledger of Custody | Immutable transfer receipt chain |
| Aegis | Fallback observability (auditd, userspace shim) |
| Obsidian Vault | TPM-sealed key hierarchy |
| Reservoir | Chamber pool with priority/burst management |
📜 Covenant: Threat Model Maintenance
Section titled “📜 Covenant: Threat Model Maintenance”“A model unexamined is a ward unguarded.”
| Trigger | Action | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| New chamber runtime (gVisor, Kata) | Re-evaluate E1, E2, E3 | Platform |
| New analysis component added | Add STRIDE row, update diagrams | Analysis |
| Supply chain incident (rule/pkg) | Activate T2/T3 mitigations | Supply Chain |
| Quarterly | Full review, update heat map | Security |
| Post-incident | Add specific threat, verify mitigations | IR Team |
🔮 Next Rites
Section titled “🔮 Next Rites”- Seal the Evidence — Implement mandatory cosign signing + RFC 3161 timestamps (R1, R2, R3)
- Bind the Ledger — Design Custody Sequence Protocol for Alter→Ward→Seal transfers (R2)
- Harden the Veil — Deploy zero-egress chamber with DNS sinkhole + TLS inspection (I1)
- Forge the Aegis — Implement auditd fallback + userspace syscall shim (D3)
- Anchor the Chronicle — Integrate Rekor transparency log for artifact anchoring (T1)
Sealed with the Sign of the Alter. Let no artifact pass unchallenged, no evidence stand unsealed, no threat dwell unmeasured.
Version: 1.0.0 | Classification: ARCANUM RESTRICTED | Custodian: Malware Research Cabal